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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Case No. 920259 CA 
Category No. 1 5 
PETITIONER'S BRIEF 
JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT 
Jurisdiction of this C o m I In review an n unlet nt I he Hn'r ion 
of Occupational and Professional Licensing ind the Department of 
Commerce i M ,,'ont errp ,1 h< fleet ion 78-2a-3, Utah Code Ann. , (1953 as 
amended). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
W i"!r i I i '-ubs4 "•"'i/il e n " * i' hi AdiTi i f) i s t n a t i v e Lav, J u d g e * 
refuse t o iiiiow l i c e n s e e mtroduce ev idence regards 
polygraph examination? 
I s ilif" i n H i i i n i i I hiit 1.1 "Hiiiiset! eiii|at|i; jnl ii SHXUII I i o n d u c t w i t h 
her client in 1985 supported by substantial evidence, when viewed 
- cue record as a whole 7 
Are the sanctions imposed 
TERESA IJ. NELNUN 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, 
Division of Occupational and 
Professional 1 licensing, 
ResDondent. 
too harsh in light of her conduct? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Licensee Teresa Nelson seeks judicial review of an Order 
on Review entered April 10, 1992, by the Division of Occupational 
and Professional Licensing, Department of Commerce, revoking her 
licenses to practice as a Clinical and Certified Social Worker in 
the State of Utah. 
The formal administrative hearing held in this matter was 
conducted pursuant to the Utah Administrative Procedures Act. 
Licensee is challenging the Order entered by the Division on 
several grounds. 
First, Licensee contends that the Administrative Law 
Judge erred by refusing to allow her to present evidence to the 
Board of Social Work Examiners that she passed a polygraph 
examination. 
Licensee also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence 
supporting the findings, and challenges the severity of the 
sanction imposed by the Division. 
In Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63 
(Utah App. 1991), this Court ruled that a party challenging the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings, must 
demonstrate that the findings are not supported by substantial 
evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the Court. 
Id. at 67; See also. Section 63-46b-16(4)(g). 
In order to show that the evidence is insufficient, a 
party must marshall the evidence in support of the findings, and 
2 
then demonstrate that despite Ulns tevedeeoe, Line 1 in<1 i ni'i1 ill i IIIU! 
adequately supported. Heinecke v. Department of Commerce, 158 UAR 
5 quoting Mountain States Broadcasting Co. 
v. Neale ,783 . 1 |IH d ti App . I{»M 9 ) 
I- important to note that under the substantial 
evident < upporting evidence is 
considered evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, Grace at 
68. In other words, once the supporting evidence has been 
marsha I led ec i.s i oil whet' her the sjjppoil; it eg e\ i denee i e enough 
to sustain findings is less deferential under the substantial 
evidence test than under the clearly erroneous standard. Heinecke 
a!. "hi 0 . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
On April 18, 1990, the Utah Division * Occupational and 
Professiona icensing, (Division) 
of the license of Teresr Nelson practice as a certified and 
c l i n i c a ] £ • - - • - • * rhe 
petition alleged that Nelson licensee) was guilty of 
unprofessiona ronduct by, • . engaging 
a 
commitment that conflicted with . interest -_.... at 
989-990). 
hel" latter, the w ,*.t filed -• . exclude any 
evidence r mention of the fact that Nelson had taken a 
polygraph examinat i tie 11- .ill I I H» 44 i The met inn hie M;, uufht 
3 
to preclude any testimony from polygraph examiners as well as 
excluding any result from evidence. The administrative law judge 
ordered that evidence of the polygraph examination given to Nelson 
shall be excluded in the hearing conducted before the Board of 
Social Work Examiners; that witnesses and counsel are prohibited 
from making any reference to the examination or to the results 
thereof in the proceedings before the Board; and that polygraph 
examiners shall be precluded from testifying during the hearing 
before the board. (R. at 185). Licensee contends that the failure 
of the administrative law judge to allow her to present polygraph 
evidence was erroneous and appeals from that order. 
A hearing was conducted on November 13-14, 1991, and then was 
resumed and completed on December 4, 1991 before J. Steven Eklund, 
Administrative Law Judge for the Department of Commerce, and the 
Board of Social Work Examiners. The board heard testimony for 
several days and issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, 
and Recommend Order. (R. at 65-80). 
The Division adopted the recommended Order that Nelson's 
license as a clinical social worker be suspended for three years, 
and that her license as a certified social worker be suspended for 
one year. The Order also required Nelson to attend receive therapy 
and complete an education program. The Order also provided that 
upon reinstatement of her license to practice as a certified social 
worker that she not practice in a private setting. 
Licensee then filed a request for agency review seeking that 
the portion of the recommended order providing for a three years 
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suspension of her license as a clinical social worker and a one 
year suspension of her license as a certified social worker be 
reversed and that she be allowed to practice. (R. at 51) . She 
also challenged the requirement that she not engage in private 
practice upon reinstatement. (R. at 51). The Order on Review 
stayed the orders revoking Nelson's licenses. The Order on Review 
also reduced the period of suspension from three years to six 
months. Other minor modifications to the Division's order were 
also made. (R. at 9-15). 
On April 20, 1992, Licensee moved to stay the order entered 
against her pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46B-18. That motion 
for a stay of the order was denied. (R. at 1) . Licensee then 
filed this appeal and the Division's order was stayed by this Court 
during the pendency of this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Petitioner Teresa Nelson (Licensee) is a licensed certified 
clinical social worker in the State of Utah. During all times 
relevant to this proceeding, she has been engaged in full-time 
private practice as a clinical social worker. She has been 
licensed in the State of Utah since 1983. (TR. at 31). 
Commencing late in 1981, Licensee provided counseling to a 
client, (K.G.) for problems associated with depression, suicidal 
ideation, alcohol and substance abuse. (R. at 67) . This counseling 
took place while Ms. Nelson was employed at the Summit County 
Prevention Center. These counseling sessions continued over a 
period of several months. Based on K.G.'s financial ability, he 
5 
was required by the Prevention Center to only make nominal payments 
for the services provided by Licensee. Nelson subsequently left 
her employment with the Summit County Prevention Center in 1982. 
In September, 1984, K.G. contacted Licensee and indicated that 
he wanted to commence counseling with her in her private practice. 
(TR. at 533). From September, 1984 to July, 1985, Licensee 
provided at least 40 hours of counseling to K.G., consisting of 
approximately 33 sessions. (R. at 67). 
At the time K.G. discussed retaining Licensee she told him 
that her fee was $55.00 per hour. (TR. at 533). K.G. told 
Licensee that he was a certified wind surfing instructor, and that 
he was unable to afford her fees. (TR. at 534). Licensee agreed 
that she would be willing to accept wind surfing lessons from K.G. 
as payment for her services. (TR. at 535-36). Licensee testified 
that she was not aware of any rule or ethical constraint against 
accepting a barter form of payment for her services. (TR. at 558) . 
Early in 1985, K.G. informed Licensee that he and his wife, 
Ruth, were experiencing marital difficulty. (R. at 69) . Licensee 
agreed to meet with K.G. 's wife, Ruth, for a single session, and to 
meet jointly with Ruth and K.G. subsequent to that. (TR. at 561) . 
Licensee met with K.G.'s wife on February 26, 1985, and 
subsequently held two joint counseling sessions beginning March 5, 
1985. Licensee testified that during her meeting with K.G.'s wife, 
she discussed with her the goals of her marriage. Licensee 
indicated that K.G.'s wife told her that she was considering a 
divorce from K.G. (TR. at 561-62) . In the joint counseling 
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sessions which Licensee held with K.G. and his wife, the 
possibility of divorce was discussed. Both K.G. and his wife 
testified that they felt that Licensee had suggested that they 
divorce. (TR. at 302) . Licensee testified that she did not 
suggest that they obtain a divorce, but rather discussed divorce 
with them as a option, and also as a therapeutic device or "shock 
technique" to persuade the parties to start seriously thinking 
about their relationship. (TR. at 563). No further joint sessions 
were conducted. 
During a therapy session with K.G. on May 28, 1985, K.G. 
informed Licensee that he and his wife were separated and filing 
for a divorce. (TR. at 574-75); (R. at 70). Licensee continued 
counseling sessions with K.G. between May 28, 1985 and July 18, 
1985. During the eight counseling sessions which Licensee held 
with K.G. between May 31, 1985 to July 18, 1985, Licensee continued 
to work with K.G. to help him to resolve some issues surrounding 
the separation from his wife. (TR. at 576). Licensee testified 
that during the last therapy session with K.G. on July 18, that 
therapy was terminated at K.G.'s request. Licensee testified that 
K.G. knew that therapy was terminated at this time; that it was 
discussed between them, and that it was her perception that he 
understood that the therapy would be terminated. (TR. at 582) . 
Licensee also testified that K.G. had realized that he could no 
longer afford the sessions with her, and that he had communicated 
that fact to her on several occasions. (TR. at 576-77). 
K.G. testified that it was not his understanding that the 
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client/therapist relationship was terminated on July 18, 1985. 
(TR. at 255-56) . His testimony was that "our relationship at that 
time was strong enough... that it was okay if I didn't see her in 
her office". (TR. at 265). K.G. further testified that he had 
developed a romantic affection for Ms. Nelson; that he was having 
sexual fantasies about her and that he was in love with her. (TR. 
at 255-56). He further testified that he never informed the 
Licensee that he had these romantic and sexual feelings toward her. 
(TR. at 356). 
The Board determined that Licensee did in fact not terminate 
the client/therapist relationship with K.G. on July 18, 1985 and 
also found that K.G. believed his status as a client did not end on 
July 18, 1985. (R. at 71). It was undisputed that K.G. was not 
seen by Licensee in her office following July 18, 1985. 
In mid-August, 1985, K.G. contacted the Licensee and asked her 
to play tennis. (TR. at 583-84). Licensee testified that she 
again informed K.G. during this conversation that the therapy 
process was over. (TR. at 584). Licensee testified that K.G. 
informed her that he only wanted to touch bases with her once in a 
while and say hello. In August and early September, 1985, K.G. and 
Licensee socialized on three separate occasions specifically, on 
one occasion they played tennis, and twice K.G visited Nelson at 
her home. (R. at 71) . 
On the second visit which K.G. paid to Licensee's house, she 
informed him that she was going on vacation to the island of Maui, 
Hawaii. K.G. told Licensee that Maui was the "wind surfing capital 
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of the world" and they discussed her trip. (TR. at 591). 
K.G. contacted Licensee two days prior to her leaving for 
Maui, and informed her that he had purchased a ticket to go to 
Maui. He further inquired as to whether she would allow him to 
stay in the condominium that she had rented. (TR. at 593-94) . 
Licensee testified that she did not believe that K.G. was 
romantically interested in her at that time, but rather that he 
wanted to go to Hawaii to wind surf and her vacation provided him 
with an inexpensive way for him to do that. (TR. at 594) . She 
agreed to allow K.G. to meet her in Hawaii. The board found that 
there was insufficient evidence to find that Licensee invited K.G. 
to join her on this trip. (R. at 71). 
Licensee and K.G. were in Hawaii for approximately one week, 
and spent the majority of their time together. (R. at 72). K.G. 
testified that while he was in Hawaii with Licensee, that she used 
strawberry icecream on him while performing oral sex. (TR.at 259) ; 
(TR. at 185). Licensee ademately denied any sexual activity with 
K.G. during the trip to Hawaii at any time in 1985. (TR.cit 530). 
The Board found that the more creditable evidence showed that 
no intercourse had occurred between K.G. and Licensee, but that 
they did engage in oral sex while in Hawaii. Interesstingly, 
however, Finding of Fact #16 states that while they did engage in 
oral sex "there is a lack of creditable evidence to find that such 
conduct took place as specifically described by K.G. during the 
proceeding." 
Following the trip to Hawaii through late October, 1985, 
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Licensee and K.G. were together on four additional occasions. 
Specifically, Licensee, her children, and K.G., had dinner at her 
home in late September; K.G. arrived drunk and unannounced at 
Licensee's home one night; they met at a soccer game in early 
October; and they also had dinner in a restaurant in late October, 
1985. The Board found that Licensee and K.G. briefly kissed and 
hugged on at least one of the occasions, but they did not engage in 
any sexual activity other than what had occurred in Hawaii during 
the previous month. (R. at 72). The Board found that the client-
therapist relationship ceased to exist after late October, 1985, 
and Licensee and K.G. had no contact whatsoever after October 1985, 
until the fall of 1988. (R. at 71). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Petitioner, Teresa Nelson, is a Licensed Clinical Certified 
Social Worker in the State of Utah. Following an administrative 
hearing before the Board of Social Work Examiners, the Division of 
Occupational and Professional Licensing issued an Order imposing 
sanctions against Petitioner's license. 
Licensee argues in this brief that the Administrative Law 
Judge erred by refusing to allow her to introduce evidence of 
polygraph results, and by refusing to allowing polygraph examiners 
to testify before the Board. 
Licensee also argues that the record as a whole does not 
support certain findings of the Board, and that the findings that 
are supported by the record as a whole do not justify the harsh 




THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE ERRED BY REFUSING TO ALLOW PETITIONER 
TO INTRODUCE EVIDENCE OF HER POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION RESULTS, AND BY 
REFUSING TO ALLOW POLYGRAPH EXAMINERS TO TESTIFY BEFORE THE BOARD. 
The Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing filed 
a Motion in Limine requesting the Administrative Law Judge to rule 
on evidentiary matters involving a polygraph examination taken by 
Petitioner Teresa Nelson. Specifically, the Division sought to 
exclude evidence 1) that Petitioner was given a polygraph 
examination; 2) that witnesses and counsel be prohibited from 
making any reference to that examination or the results thereof; 3) 
that polygraph examiners be precluded from testifying at the 
hearing, and 4) that all witnesses be instructed not to refer to 
the examination or the results thereof. 
Section 63-46b-8(1)(b), UTAH CODE ANN., provides that on the 
motion of the presiding officer or upon objection of a party, the 
presiding officer may exclude evidence that is irrelevant, 
immaterial, or unduly repetitious. Relying on this authority, the 
Administrative Law Judge granted the Divisionfs motion to exclude 
all polygraph evidence. Petitioner asserts that this ruling 
constitutes error, and is not consistent with the somewhat relaxed 
rules of evidence that apply at administrative hearings. 
It is well settled in Utah that polygraph examination 
results may be admitted into evidence when there is a valid 
stipulation between the parties. State v. Abel. 600 P.2d 994, 998 
(Utah 1979) . The Court in Abel expressly left open the question of 
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whether polygraph results may be admitted in the absence of a 
stipulation. The Court has provided criteria useful in determining 
when polygraph results may be admitted. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that the strict rules as to 
the admissibility of evidence are somewhat relaxed in 
administrative hearings. State Dep't of Community Affairs v. Utah 
Merit System Council, 614 P.2d 1259, 1262 (Utah 1980). Section 63-
46b-8(l)(c) provides that evidence will not be excluded solely on 
the basis that it is hearsay. Given the less ridgid rules 
governing admission of evidence at an administrative hearing, the 
administrative law judge should not have excluded the polygraph 
results only because the Division did not stipulate to their 
admission. 
In State v. Rebetrano. 681 P.2d 1265 (Utah 1984), the Utah 
Supreme Court noted that certain conditions must be met before 
stipulated polygraph results could be admitted into evidence. 
First, participation in the examination must be free and voluntary. 
The Court must be allowed to exclude evidence if the examiner was 
not qualified, or if the conditions under which the test was 
administered were unfair. Further, the party opposing the evidence 
must be allowed to cross examine the examiner as to his expertise; 
the reliability of polygraph examinations; and the accuracy of the 
apparatus used. The trier of fact should also be instructed that 
the examiners opinion is not conclusive, but is only to be taken as 
an opinion. Id. at 1268. 
In the case at bar, admission of the results was not 
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stipulated to by the Division. However, the conditions of the 
Rebetrano decision could all have been met. There is no question 
that the Licensee's participation in the test was free and 
voluntary. Further, the Division could easily have been afforded 
the opportunity to cross-examine the examiner as to his expertise; 
and also examine the examiner as to the reliability of the 
polygraph itself and the accuracy of the apparatus used. In 
denying Nelson the opportunity to even lay the foundation to 
determine whether the polygraph results could be admitted, the ALJ 
erred. 
In State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1977), the Utah 
Supreme Court did not allow a defendant in a criminal case to use 
evidence of a polygraph examination in the absence of a 
stipulation. It is clear from the Tillman decision that the 
decision as to whether to admit polygraph evidence is determinative 
upon an adaquate foundation for assessing the reliability and 
probative value of the polygraph examination. Id. at 557. In this 
case, the Licensee was never given the opportunity to lay a 
foundation for the polygraph. The ALJ apparently adopted the 
position that the polygraph evidence is per se inadmissabl€* in the 
absence of a stipulation. 
In The Florida Bar v. Pavlick, 504 So.2d 1231 (Fla. 1987), the 
Florida Supreme Court considered a case in which polygraph results 
were admitted in evidence in the absence of a stipulation. In 
Pavlick, an attorney facing disbarment offerred evidence that he 
had taken and passed a polygraph examination. In Pavlick. as well 
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as in the case at bar, the evidence of professional wrongdoing 
consisted of the statements of one individual. The only evidence 
that Nelson engaged in sexual activity with K.G. in Hawaii was 
K.G.'s statement to that affect, an accusation that was made four 
years after the alleged wrongful conduct was to have occurred. 
In Commonwealth v. Moore, 393 N.E.2d 904, 910, (Mass. 1979), 
the Supreme Court of Massachusetts considered the question of 
failing to admit a polygraph result to impeach a prosecution 
witness. The Moore Court did not overturn the conviction below due 
to the failure of the court to allow the evidence, noting that 
there were several other witnesses that testified to the same 
facts. In this case, K.G.'s accusation is the only evidence of 
wrongdoing that would justify the revocation levied upon Nelson. 
The absence of a stipulation should not preclude the admission 
of polygraph results in administrative hearings. As the Utah 
Supreme Court noted in Abel, "a stipulation does not in any way 
establish the reliability or accuracy of polygraph results." Id. 
at 997. The Court has also found that polygraph tests properly 
administered do have a degree of reliability. Rebetrano at 1269. 
Given the fact that the statement of Nelson's accuser was the 
only substantial evidence that the sexual activity in Hawaii 
occurred, and that was the evidence that was the basis for the 
revocation of her license, the ALJ errer by not allowing the Board 
to hear the polygraph evidence. 
14 
POINT 11 
THE RECORD AS A WHOLE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE FINDING THAT 
LICENSEE ENGAGED IN SEXUAL CONDUCT WITH K.G. IN 1985. 
Section 58-35-11, Utah Code Ann., (1953 as amended), 
provides that the Division of Occupational and Professional 
Licensing may suspend or revoke the license of a clini cal or 
certified socia worker if the Licensee has engaged in 
unprofessional ;, ; ; is section includes unprofessional 
conduct to include a violation of rules established by the 
Division. The ethical responsibilities of a social worker to a 
client are set forth in R153-35-5(B)(1 ), whi ch provides in part: 
(e) The social Worker should under no circumstances 
engage in sexual activity with clients. 
In its Findings of Fact and Recommended Order, the Board 
determined that Licensee and K.G. engaged in sexual activity while 
in Hawaii in September, 1985, and found that Licensee 'bad not 
properly terminated the client/therapist relationship at that time. 
The so] e basi s for finding that Licensee and K.G. engaged in 
sexual conduct while in Hawaii in 1985 comes from the testimony of 
K.G. Licensee contends that this testimony is false and 
incredible. That testimony, in part, indicates: 
Q. And is what you claimed happened in Maui, Mr. G., 
that Ms. Nelson, that Teresa Nelson, performed 
oral sex on you? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And isn't is true that you claim she employed 
strawberry ice cream? 
A She did on one occasion, yes. 
Q. And I think you have testified before that you had 
] 5 
eaten strawberry ice cream with her for dessert prior 
to that particular event? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Isn't it true that what you claim is that she 
performed, on you, oral sex? 
A. That's correct. 
(TR. at 260-261). 
The Board in Finding of Fact #16 determined that Licensee 
and K.G. engaged in oral sex while in Hawaii in 1985, but found 
that "there is a lack of credible evidence to find that the conduct 
took place as specifically described bv K.G. during the instant 
proceeding." (R. at 71). Licensee contends that this Finding is 
incompatible with the testimony, and is not supported by the record 
as a whole. In essence, by finding that there is a lack of 
credible evidence to believe that the conduct took place as 
described by K.G., the Board chose not to believe the particulars 
of his testimony on this issue. As K.G.'s testimony of what took 
place in Hawaii was the only evidence before the Board of any 
sexual activity, it is interesting that the Board rejected his 
specific description of what took place, but still choose to 
believe the trust of his testimony. (R. at 72). 
Licensee contends that as the board clearly did not 
believe this portion of K.G.'s testimony, and that there is no 
credible evidence upon which to base the finding that the activity 
occurred. 
In Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63 
(Utah App. 1991), this Court held that to successfully challenge a 
finding on appeal from an administrative proceeding, the party must 
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demonstrate that the finding is not supported by substantial 
evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the Court. 
Id. at 67-68. 
In its Findings of Fact and Recommended Order, the Board 
relies upon the "credible testimony offered by K.G.'s brother and 
ex-wife," to corroborate the testimony of K.G. to conclude that 
sexually intimate activity occurred while K.G. and Licensee were in 
Hawaii in 1985. (Findings of Fact, p.13 Appendix). 
There is nothinq in th£ testimony of K.G.'s brother or i n 
the testimony of his ex-wife which corroborates the fact that th i s 
activity took place. Indeed, in his own testimony, K.G. testified 
that he did not tell anybody the details of the alleged sexual 
encounter until 1990. (TR. at 261) . If K.G. told nobody the 
details of the alleged sexual activity with Licensee until five 
years after the fact, how can the testimony of those he *-^ id 
corroborate his testimony? Licensee asserts that the testimony f 
K.G.'s brother and K.G.!s ex-wife provide no corroboration t - s 
portion of his testimony. 
Further, under the substantial evidence test, both 
conf 1 icting and supporting evidence are c orisidereel i n eva 1 uati i :ig 
the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding. Grace at 68. 
This Court also noted in Heinecke v. Department of Commerce, 158 
UAR 55 (Utah App 1981), that; less deference Is given to the 
findings under the substantial evidence standard than under the 
clearly erroneous test. Id. at 60, fn, 7, Licensee has adamately 
denied that any sexual activity with K.G. occurred in 198?), the 
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year of the trip to Hawaii. (TR. at 530). Indeed, it was with 
respect to this very issue that Licensee sought to introduce 
polygraph evidence to support her contention. 
Given the fact that the Board rejected K.G.'s specific 
rendition of the alleged sexual activity in Hawaii in 1985; the 
conflict in the evidence as to this point; and the fact that five 
years elapsed before K.G. told anyone the details of the alleged 
sexual conduct, this Court should find that this finding is not 
supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the 
record as a whole. 
POINT III 
THE CONDUCT OF LICENSEE WHICH IS SUPPORTED BY THE 
RECORD AS A WHOLE DOES NOT JUSTIFY THE HARSH SANCTIONS 
IMPOSED BY THE DIVISION. 
The Board found that Licensee was also guilty of 
unprofessional conduct in that she violated R-153-35-5(B)(1)(d), 
which reads, the social worker should avoid relationships or 
commitments that conflict with the interest of clients. 
As set out in the Statement of Facts, Licensee began her 
counseling of K.G. while she was employed at the Summit County 
Prevention Center. Licensee left her employment with Summit County 
in 1982. In September, 1984, K.G. contacted Licensee and indicated 
that he wanted to commence counseling with her in her private 
practice. Licensee testified that she told K.G. that her fee was 
$55.00 per hour, and asked what type of arrangements he would need 
to make for payment. (TR. at 533-34) . At that time, K.G. informed 
Licensee that he was a certified wind surfing instructing, and she 
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agreed to accept wind surfing lessons from K.G. as payment for her 
services. 
The Board determined that before September 4, 1984, and July 
18, 1985, K.G. provided Licensee with one or two ski lessons and 
three to six wi nd sur f I rig lessons. Licensee * s two children! of ten 
accompanied her and K.G. during the wind surfing lessons. (R.at 
69) . The Board determined that while a bartering agreement for 
services does not, in and of itself, constitute unprofessional 
conduct within the meaning of R153-35-5(B)(1)(d), that the 
agreement between Licensee and K.G was vague and therefore left 
K.G. without a clear understanding of the scope and duration of the 
agreement,, (R at 74). The Board noted that Licensee usually 
brought a picnic ,1 unch wi th her during wi nd surf I ng lessons wi th 
K.G., and that this conduct created a social atmosphere. 
The Board found that this was an exercise of poor judgment by 
Licensee, which she should have avoided. It is important to note, 
however, that the Board stated "There is no evidence respondent 
(Licensee) acted with malicious intent to K.G.'s detriment or that 
her conduct was only self-serving in nature." It if : u e t-ha t 
Licensee exercised poor judgment in that instance, but such conduct 
does not justify such harsh sanctions as suspension of her license, 
or barring her from the private practice of social work. 
While the testimony was conflicting as to whether Licensee 
informed K. G that the cl i ent/therapist relationshi p had tei: minated 
prior to going to Hawaii in 1985, it is undisputed that after 
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returning home, K.G. did not again see Licensee in her office. 
After returning home, K.G. saw Licensee on four additional 
occasions in 1985, the last occurring in late October. The Board 
found this conduct to be problematic in that K.G. had not 
appropriately terminated the therapist/client relationship prior to 
that time. K.G. testified that after his last visit with Licensee 
in October, 1985, he made the decision to stop seeing Teresa Nelson 
on his own (TR. at 265) . He went on to indicate that he had no 
trouble in making that decision, and that the decision did not 
cause him any pain or anguish (TR. at 265). 
The Board found that Licensee and K.G. had no contact of any 
nature from late October 1985 until the fall of 1988, and 
determined that the client/therapist relationship ceased to exist 
after late October 1985. 
Assuming arguendo that Licensee Nelson did allow a social 
relationship to exist with K.G. after she had stopped seeing him in 
her office, that would provide a basis for discipline. Similarly, 
the bartering agreement, due to its vague nature and personal 
service aspects, may also provide a basis upon which the Division 
could sanction Licensee. Nonetheless, Licensee urges this court to 
find that the sanctions imposed by the division are unduly harsh 
given her conduct. In short, the severe sanction of revocation or 
suspension of license should be reserved for the most serious 
ethical violations. 
The only activity alleged by the division which may justify a 
suspension of the license would be the existence of the sexual 
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relationship taken place in Hawaii in 1985. * is also important 
to note as a mitigating factor that the alleged conduct took place 
in 1985; nearly five years before K.G. reported the al leged 
specifics of the conduct to anyone. During that time, Licensee has 
continued to practice social work ii private setting with no 
other complaints against her, thert-i-- niionstrat i ng tha* she is 
not a significant risk to the public's health and safety. But as 
Licensee argued above, the findings relative to the conduct in 
Hawaii are not supported by substantial evidence. Ii 1 fact, tl: le 
finding relative to that conduct makes it clear that the Board did 
not believe K Gfs version, of what took place, but nonetheless chose 
to believe that something took place. Licensee urges this court to 
set aside the suspension of her right to practice social work in a 
private setti ng, and urges thi s coui t to a] low her to con/ti iiiie to 
do so without an interruption in her license status. 
CONCLUSION 
The sanctions imposed against Teresa Nelson's license to 
practice social work will result in substantial hardship which will 
seriously effect her ability to earn a living. Ms. Nelson 
acknowledges that she made a poor decision in allowing K.G. to meet 
her in Hawaii, and perhaps allowed the social relationship with 
K.G. to exceed the appropriate boundaries. Nonetheless, the 
severity of the sanctions against her are too harsh, particularly 
in light of the fact that the most serious alleged conduct: t 
Licensee was disputed, and the A.L.J, refused to allow her to 
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introduce polygraph evidence directly bearing on that conduct. 
Licensee urges this court to overturn the portion of the Order 
suspending her licenses, and barring her from the private practice 
of social work. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2- / day of December, 1992. 
ANN L. WASSERMANN 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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APPENDIX 
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL 6 PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSES OF 
TERESA L. NELSON 
TO PRACTICE AS A CERTIFIED AND 
CLINICAL SOCIAL WORKER 
IN THE STATE OF UTAH 
O R D E R 
Case No. OPL-90-26 
The attached Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Recommended Order are hereby adopted by the Director of the 
Division of Occupational & Professional Licensing of the State of 
Utah. Respondent's licenses are thus suspended, effective thirty 
(30) days from the date of this Order. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the suspended licenses, both wall 
and wallet sizes, as well as the embossed certificate, thus be 
surrendered to the Division of Occupational and Professional 
Licensing. 
Dated this /o^ day of January, 1992. 
if-'. 
id. JU2^Z/: '7 
David E. RplSinson 
D i r e c t o r - ^ ^ 
S -M, M£~ . 
'"Administrative review of this Order may be obtained by 
filing a request for agency review with the executive director of 
the Department within thirty (30) days after issuance of this 
Order. Any such request must comply with the requirements of the 
Utah Code Ann. 63-46b-12(l) and R151-46b-12 of the departmental 
rules which govern agency review. 
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSES OF : FINDINGS OF FACT 
TERESA L. NELSON : CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
TO PRACTICE AS A CERTIFIED AND : AND RECOMMENDED ORDER 
CLINICAL SOCIAL WORKER : 
IN THE STATE OF UTAH : CASE NO. OPL-90 -2 6 
Appearances: 
Melissa M. Hubbell for the Division of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing 
Suzanne M. Dallimore for Respondent 
THE BOARD: 
Pursuant to notice duly served by certified mail, a hearing 
was conducted in the above-entitled matter on November 13-14, 
1991 and was then resumed and completed on December 4, 1991 
before J. Steven Eklund, Administrative Law Judge for the 
Department of Commerce, and the Board of Social Work Examiners. 
Board members present, lor the hearing were Eugene Gibbons, Ann M. 
Talbot, Patricia Gamble-Hovey, Jennifer Bartell and Mary 
Bearnson. David E. Robinson, the Director of the Division of 
Occupational and Professional Licensing, was also present. 
Thereafter, evidence was received. During the first day of 
the hearing, Ms. Gamble-Hovey was recused from further 
participation in both the hearing and subsequent del i beration by 
the Board in this proceeding. The Board, being fully advised in 
the premises, now enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Respondent is, and at times relevant to these 
proceedings has been, licensed to practice as a certified and 
clinical social worker in the State of Utah. The record does not 
reflect when Respondent was licensed as a certified social 
worker, although she was employed in that capacity at the Summit 
County Prevention Center in 1980 and subsequently became the 
director of that facility. Respondent obtained her license as a 
clinical social worker in 1983, she left the Center in June 1984 
and then commenced a full-time private practice as a clinical 
social worker with Affiliated Psychotherapists. 
2. Commencing sometine late in 1981, Respondent provided 
counseling to a client, referred to herein as K.G., for problems 
associated with depression, suicidal ideation, alcohol and 
substance abuse. Counseling continued for a number of months, 
often on a weekly basis, and charges for Respondent's services 
were based on a sliding fee schedule. Given his limited 
financial ability, K.G. was required to make only nominal 
payments for Respondent's services. K.G. subsequently left 
treatment sometime in 1982 and he married in 1983. 
3. On September 4, 1984, K.G. commenced treatment with 
Respondent, who provided approximately forty-one (41) hours of 
counseling over thirty-three (33) sessions with K.G. through July 
18, 1985. Those sessions addressed K.G.'s alcohol abuse, major 
depressive episodes, dysphoric mood, loss of interest and energy, 
feelings of hopelessness and worthlessness, diminished ability to 
think or concentrate, indecisiveness, suicidal ideation and his 
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recurrent thoughts of death. 
4 a Between December 7, 1984 and April 9, 1^ 8b K u |J<JHJ 
Respondent a total of $530 as partial compensation for the* 
therapy sessions. When K.G. had resumed counseling with 
Respondent in 1984, they agreed he would subsequently provide r.ki 
and wjndsurf i nq lessons to Respondent as compensation for her 
services. Beyond the above-stated cash payments, Respondent and 
K.G. apparently understood that one ski or windsurfing lesson 
would be exchanger! fm each therapy session. 
5. When Respondent and K.G. agreed to barter their 
services, Respondent normally charged $55 for a one (1) hour 
session. No discussion occurred between Respondent and K.G. as 
to what the latter would normally charge for lessons he would 
provide, no common understanding existed as to the duration of 
their bartering agreement and Respondent believed the lessons she 
received from K.G. would only operate to pay for some of her 
counseling services. 
6. Respondent had previously bartered her; services with two 
other clients to obtain a single ski lesson on one occasion and, 
in other Instance?, piano lessons for her children, In edch case, 
the value of the respective services to be exchanqijd was 
initially discussed between Respondent and her client and each 
party to thw agreement understood the extent of services which 
would be bartered. 
7. Between September 4, 1984 and July 18, 1985, K.G. 
provided Respondent with 1-2 ski lessons and 3-6 windsurfing 
lessons. During one of the ski lessons, K.G. provided little -
3 
if any - instruction on skiing techniques to Respondent, he spoke 
to Respondent of family ski outings with his parents when he was 
a child and generally considered the time he spent with 
Respondent during the lesson as similar to that of a therapy 
session. As she testified during this proceeding, Respondent's 
interaction with K.G. at that time was consistent with the 
Rogarian approach she might use in therapy sessions with a 
client. 
8. K.G. is a certified windsurfing instructor and has 
offered such lessons to other individuals. Respondent's two 
children often accompanied her and K.G. when the latter provided 
windsurfing lessons. Respondent usually brought a picnic lunch 
on those occasions. Such conduct created a social atmosphere 
unlike that present during windsurfing lessons K.G. has offered 
to other individuals at other times. 
9. During therapy sessions in early 1985, K.G. periodically 
informed Respondent of conflicts with his wife, who was initially 
reluctant to participate in marriage counseling. During two 
sessions in February 1985, K.G. told Respondent his wife had 
agreed to start such counseling and he expressed hope his 
marriage would continue. 
10. On February 26, 1985, Respondent met only with K.G.'s 
wife. Respondent then held two co-joint counseling sessions on 
March 5 and 19, 1985. Respondent believed many unalterable 
conflicts existed in the marriage and she inquired of both K.G. 
and his wife if they had considered obtaining a divorce. Based 
on the credible evidence presented, both K.G. and his wife 
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believed Respondent had thus suggested they should be divorced. 
No further co-joint sessions were conducted, During K.G.'s next 
session on April 9, 1985, Respondent noted K.G.'s marital 
relationship appeared in be deterioratinq K.G, told Respondent 
he was depressed and informed her that he was considering a 
divorce. 
11 During the next counselinq session on Ma\ ?Bt 19 as( 
K.G. informed Respondent that he and his wife were separated and 
filing for a divorce. "When K.G. also told Respondent he was 
depressed, she decided to commence hypnosis and util I ze age 
regression techniques to obtain more information regarding K.G.'s 
lack of nurturi ng and his ability to self-nurture. 
12, Respondent used hypnosis and age regression techniques 
during eight (8) counseling sessions with K.G. between May 31, 
1985 and 3 til y 2 8, 1 985,, Duri ng a June 10, 1985 session, K.G. 
expressed sadness regarding his divorce and indicated he f€ilt 
empty and suicidal. During a July 8, 1985 session, Respondent 
related he had attempted suicide the night before hi s wife left 
and he was tired of not feeling good. He also expressed a sense 
of hopelessness, sadness and frustration. 
13. The last formal therapy session Respondent provided to 
K.G. was conducted in her office on July 18, 1985. Respondent 
used hypnosis during that session, she noted K.G. lacked 
direction in his career goals and he was chemically more stable. 
Respondent recommended K.G. continue with his existing 
medicati on. Clinical notes from Respondent's records do not 
reflect she terminated K.G. as a client at that time. 
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14. Based on the more credible evidence presented, 
Respondent did not inform K.G. the client/therapist relationship 
was terminated on July 18, 1985 and there is no evidence K.G. 
believed his status as a client ended after that therapy session. 
Based on the* more credible evidence, and given the relatively 
indefinite manner in which Respondent had obtained compensation 
for the services she had provided to K.G. since September 1984, 
there was no agreement between them to end his therapy based on 
any concern he would be unable to pay for ongoing treatment. A 
review of Respondent's clinical notes does not reflect K.G. had 
progressed in counseling as to no longer require therapy. 
15. Between mid-August 1985 and early-September 1985, 
Respondent and K.G. socialized on three occasions. Specifically, 
they played tennis and K.G. twice visited Respondent at her home. 
During that second visit in early September 1985, Respondent 
informed K.G. she was leaving for a vacation in Hawaii on 
September 15, 1985. There is a lack of sufficient evidence to 
find that Respondent invited K.G. to join her. However, 
Respondent told K.G. she would be staying in a condominium while 
there, she informed him of both the length of her trip and her 
scheduled departure and further indicated she would have access 
to a rental car. 
16. A few days prior to her departure for Hawaii, K.G. 
informed Respondent he had purchased an airline ticket and 
inquired if he could join her. Respondent agreed, she arrived in 
Hawaii on September 15, 1985 and met K.G. at the airport when he 
arrived that same day on a subsequent flight. They stayed in 
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Hawaii for approximately one week and spent a majority of their 
time together.(Based on the more credible evidence presented, 
Respondent and K.G. slept together and periodically engaged in 
conduct which was sexually intimate in nature.I While no 
intercourse occurred, Respondent and K.G. did engage in oral sex, 
although there is a lack of credible evidence to find that such 
conduct took place as specifically described by K.G. during the 
instant proceeding. 
17. Respondent and K.G. left Hawaii on separate flights. 
During the following month until late-October 1985, they were 
together on four additional occasions. Specifically, Respondent, 
her two children and K.G. had dinner at Respondent's home in 
late-September 1985, K.G. arrived drunk and unannounced at 
Respondent's home one night, they met at a soccer game 
approximately one week later and they also had dinner at a 
restaurant in late-October 1985. Based on the more credible 
evidence, Respondent and K.G. briefly kissed and hugged at least 
one of those occasions, but they did not engage in any sexual 
activity other than what had occurred in Hawaii during the 
previous month. 
19. Respondent and K.G. had no contact of any nature from 
late-October 1985 until the fall of 1988 and their 
client/therapist relationship ceased to exist after late-October 
1985. Based on the more credible evidence presented, that 
relationship did not resume at any time during subsequent contact 
which occurred between Respondent and K.G. from the fall of 1988 
through mid-1989. 
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20. K.G. obtained outpatient alcohol rehabilitative 
treatment for three weeks in Oregon during mid-1989. On July 31, 
1989, K.G. commenced inpatient therapy at the Western Institute 
of Neuropsychiatry in Utah to address both his alcohol dependency 
and a suicide attempt. K.G. was subsequently referred to another 
therapist for further counseling and he has been receiving such 
therapy during the past two years. 
21. Based on the credible evidence presented, K.G. has 
blamed himself for the relationship which existed with 
Respondent, he has been somewhat traumatized by his recollection 
of certain aspects of that relationship and he encountered some 
difficulty in subsequently discussing that relationship with 
other therapists. Given his feelings of guilt, betrayal and 
self-condemnaition, K.G. was adversely impacted - to some degree -
in his ability to trust therapy and subsequently obtain 
counseling from other therapists. This record does not reflect 
the current state of K.G.'s mental health or the degree of 
progress he may have realized in counseling during the past two 
years with his present therapist. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Respondent acknowledges she exercised poor judgment when she 
allowed K.G. to join her in Hawaii. However, Respondent contends 
she never engaged in any conduct which conflicted with K.G.'s 
interests and she did not misuse her professional relationship as 
his therapist for her own personal gain. Respondent further 
asserts their client/therapist relationship ceased prior to the 
Hawaiian vacation and did not subsequently resume. Respondent 
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thus urges no basis exists to enter any disciplinary sanction as 
to her license. 
Section 58-35-11, Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended, 
provides the Division may suspend or revoke the license of a 
certified or clinical social worker if the licensee has engaged 
in unprofessional conduct. Section 58-35-11(6) defines 
unprofessional conduct to include a violation of rules 
established by the Division. R153-35-5(B)(1) generally sets 
forth that the social worker's primary ethical responsibility is 
to clients. That rule further provides: 
(d) The social worker should avoid 
relationships or commitments that conflict 
with the interests of clients. 
(e) The social worker should under no 
circumstances engage in sexual activities 
with clients. 
Respondent engaged in unethical conduct violative of R153-
35-5(B)(l)(d) in various instances. The Board initially notes 
that, while Respondent agreed to exchange counseling services for 
lessons from K.G., the bartering of her services does not - in 
and of itself - constitute unprofessional conduct within the 
meaning of R153-35-5(B)(1)(d). However, it is evident the 
agreement between Respondent and K.G. was not well defined and no 
clear understanding existed as to the scope and duration of that 
agreement. 
Further, the agreement between Respondent and K.G. was not 
typical of bartering agreements Respondent had made with other 
clients. It is particularly disturbing that Respondent agreed 
to receive a direct personal service from K.G., the nature and 
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duration of which established a social relationship between them. 
On at least one occasion during a lesson, Respondent and K.G. 
interacted in a manner similar to that which had occurred during 
any given therapy session. Such conduct was not congruent with 
either K.G.'s or Respondent's role in a mere instructor/ student 
relationship. The resulting dual relationship which existed 
necessarily presented some confusion to K.G. 
Moreover, given K.G.'s existing problems with alcoholism and 
Respondent's diagnosis of his mental condition, it is critically 
significant she failed to understand and appreciate K.G. would 
thus tend to develop increasing dependency on her as his 
therapist. The nature of the bartering agreement between 
Respondent and K.G. also fostered such dependency and reflects 
Respondent's further failure to manage the therapeutic 
relationship in such a way that the proper boundaries of that 
relationship were clearly understood by the client. 
Had Respondent carefully evaluated K.G.'s condition, she 
would have properly understood the nature of the dynamics he 
brought to the therapy relationship and she should have 
necessarily avoided engaging in pleasureable activities with K.G. 
in a socialized setting. There is no evidence Respondent acted 
with malicious intent to K.G.'s detriment or that her conduct was 
only self-serving in nature. However, Respondent either did not 
adequately evaluate or she disregarded the nature of K.G.'s 
condition and thus interacted with him in a manner which 
conflicted with his best interests. 
Given the extended duration of therapy Respondent had 
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provided to K.G. prior to early 1985, coupled with the 
inappropriate bartering agreement which existed, Respondent also 
failed to promote the best interests of the marriage between K.G. 
and his wife. They could have reasonably understood Respondent 
had advised them to obtain a divorce. While Respondent did not 
intend to direct them toward such action, the counseling she 
offered to them was ambiguous and she should have scrupulously 
avoided any uncertainty as to whether she was advising them to 
end their marriage. 
The nature of co-joint counseling Respondent offered was 
particularly disconcerting to K.G.'s wife, who was also her 
client and had informed Respondent she wanted her marriage to 
remain intact. K.G.'s wife was aware of the existence and nature 
of the bartering agreement between K.G. and Respondent. Such 
knowledge caused her to reasonably believe that an alliance and 
socialization existed between Respondent and K.G. which, in turn, 
hindered her ability to candidly discuss marital problems with 
Respondent toward possible improvement in her marriage. Under 
such circumstances, Respondent should not have provided any co-
joint marriage counseling and the nature of the therapy she did 
offer was not consistent with the interests of both clients. 
Given K.G.'s dependency on Respondent as his therapist, he 
perceived the contact between them which arose from the bartering 
agreement to be beneficial to him in a therapeutic sense, even 
though Respondent may not have either recognized or intended that 
result. However, the enhanced dependency created by the nature 
of the bartering agreement was not proper. Furthermore, the 
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continuing interaction between Respondent and K.G. which occurred 
in social settings after July 18, 1985 improperly tended to 
sustain K.G. in a therapeutic sense and confirmed his ongoing 
belief that a client/therapist relationship continued to exist. 
All credible evidence suggests that no basis existed to 
terminate the just-stated relationship in mid-July 1985, no such 
termination actually occurred and, in light of his condition at 
that time, it would have not been in K.G.'s best interest to 
terminate that relationship. Ironically, Respondent should have 
continued to provide formal therapy to K.G. after July 18, 1985 
rather than precipitously terminate therapy sessions in an office 
setting and continue on-going contacts with K.G. elsewhere. 
Had Respondent intended to unmistakably end K.G.'s status as 
a client in mid-July 1985, she had the responsibility to utilize 
proper procedures to terminate that relationship. Respondent 
clearly failed to do so. Her clinical notes do not corroborate 
her claims that K.G. desired to end therapy, that therapy for him 
was no longer warranted or that any other proper basis existed to 
end the client/therapist relationship. Further, her testimony in 
that regard is not persuasive. 
Given all of the foregoing, it is not surprising K.G. wanted 
to accompany Respondent to Hawaii and it is entirely regrettable 
Respondent consented to that joint vacation. Based on 
Respondent's testimony as to the motivation for her acquiescence 
in that regard, she had clearly assumed undue responsibility for 
K.G.'s general welfare. Thus, Respondent's inability or 
unwillingness to avoid cross-tranference with K.G. also 
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conflicted with his best interests. 
Sparing detail, Respondent also violated R153-35-5(B)(1)(e). 
The Board initially notes that K.G.'s conduct in relationships 
with other individuals reflects a degree of situational ethics 
and dishonesty. The Board further recognizes the somewhat self-
serving nature of Respondent's testimony, particularly given the 
nature of this proceeding and possible consequences as to her 
licensure. However, based on credible testimony offered by 
K.G.'s brother and ex-wife which tends to corroborate K.G.'s 
testimony, and a considered assessment of the respective 
credibility of both K.G. and Respondent,/ the Board concludes that 
physically intimate sexual activity occurred while they were in 
Hawaii.\ 
Thus, an appropriate basis exists to enter a disciplinary 
sanction with respect to Respondent's ability to practice as a 
certified and clinical social worker in this state. Commendably, 
Respondent has adjusted the nature of her practice in certain 
respects as a result of her experience with K.G. as a client. 
Specifically, Respondent no longer offers counseling to single 
male clients other than in a family setting, she does not permit 
home visits by clients and she thus recognizes certain boundary 
issues and the need to avoid creating inappropriate levels of 
dependency between herself and clients. Further, there is no 
evidence Respondent has engaged in unprofessional conduct with 
respect to other clients. 
Despite the foregoing, Respondent did engage in highly 
questionable clinical practices with regard to the counseling she 
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offered to K.G. The nature of the numerous deficiencies in 
Respondent's professional performance reflects the need for 
additional education of a remedial nature. Respondent's conduct 
also periodically conflicted with the best interests of both K.G. 
and his ex-wife in various respects. Thusf an appropriately 
severe sanction should enter to reflect the extreme degree of 
Respondent's departure from generally accepted ethical standards 
which govern her profession and with due regard for the adverse 
consequences which resulted from that misconduct. 
RECOMMENDED ORDER 
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that Respondent's licenses to 
practice as a certified and clinical social worker in the State 
of Utah be revoked. 
It is further ordered that a stay of enforcement enter as to 
the just-stated revocation, Respondent's license as a clinical 
social worker shall be suspended for three (3) years and her 
license as a certified social worker shall be suspended for one 
(1) year, effective thirty (30) days from the date this 
Recommended Order may be adopted by the Director of the Division 
of Occupational and Professional Licensing. The suspension of 
Respondent's licenses is subject to the following terms and 
conditions: 
1. Respondent shall receive individual 
therapy from either a psychologist, 
psychiatrist or clinical social worker who 
has been licensed in that capacity and 
continuously so employed for at least the 
last five (5) years. At a minimum, such 
therapy shall address Respondent's ethical 
violations, her responsiblity for that 
conduct, the manner in which her codependency 
may have contributed to her misconduct and 
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proper procedures necessary to manage a 
client/therapist relationship. 
2. Within thirty (30) days from the date 
this Recommended Order may be adopted, 
Respondent shall submit the name of the 
above-referenced therapist for Board review 
and possible approval. Thereafter, 
Respondent's therapist shall submit written 
reports to the Board every six (6) months as 
to the nature of therapy provided to 
Respondent and her progress in that regard. 
Therapy shall continue until such time as 
Respondent's therapist informs the Board it 
is no longer warranted and the Board 
recommends that therapy may cease. 
3. Respondent shall meet with the Board 
during the next regularly scheduled Board 
meeting held after this Recommended Order may 
be adopted. Thereafter, Respondent shall 
meet with the Board every six (6) months 
during the terms of suspension set forth 
herein. The frequency of such meetings may 
be subsequently modified, as deemed warranted 
by the Board. 
4. Respondent shall complete coursework 
which addresses the subjects of professional 
values and ethics, DSM - III, human growth 
and development, and clinical practice 
procedures. Within thirty (30) days from the 
date this Recommended Order may be adopted, 
Respondent shall submit an education program 
for Board review and approval, which provides 
a minimum of nine (9) quarter hours to be 
completed in that respect. 
5. Upon satisfactory completion of the 
above-stated terms and conditions and the 
expiration of the one (1) year suspension of 
Respondent's license as a certified social 
worker, Respondent may practice in that 
capacity in an agency setting, but may not 
engage in private practice. Respondent's 
employment shall be subject to supervision by 
a licensed clinical social worker. 
Respondent shall provide prior written notice 
to the Board of any such employment and her 
prospective supervisor in that regard. Upon 
Board review and approval, such employment 
may commence and Respondent's supervisor 
shall submit written reports to the Board 
every six (6) months as to the nature of 
15 
Respondent7s duties and her performance in 
that regard. 
Should Respondent fail to comply with the above-stated terms 
and conditions or otherwise violate any statute or rule which 
governs her practice as a social worker in the State of Utah, 
further proceedings shall be conducted and a determination made 




DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSES 
OF TERESA L. NELSON TO PRACTICE 
AS A CERTIFIED AND CLINICAL 
SOCIAL WORKER IN THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
ORDER ON REVIEW 
CASE NO. OPL-90-26 
INTRODUCTION 
By order dated January 10, 1992 (the "Order") , the Director of 
the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing of the Utah 
Department of Commerce (the "Division") adopted the findings of 
fact, conclusions of law, and recommended order of the Utah Board 
of Social Work Examiners (the "Board")- The Order followed a 
hearing on a petition filed by the Division requesting sanctions 
against the license of Teresa L. Nelson ("Respondent") to practice 
as a certified social worker and as a clinical social worker. 
The Order revoked Respondent's licenses to practice as a 
certified social worker and as a clinical social worker. The 
revocations were stayed subject to certain conditions, among them: 
that Respondent's license as a clinical social worker be suspended 
for three years, and the license as a certified social worker be 
suspended for one year; that Respondent receive therapy; that she 
complete an education program; and that upon reinstatement of her 
license to practice as a certified social worker she not practice 
in a private setting. 
Respondent filed a request for agency review, and the Division 
filed a response thereto. Respondent was represented by an 
attorney at the hearing and also in her request for review. In 
connection with review, Respondent seeks the following remedies: 
1. that the portions of the Recommended Order providing for 
a three-year suspension of Respondent's license as a clinical 
social worker, and a one-year suspension of her license as a 
certified social worker, be reversed and instead, that an order 
enter permitting Respondent to continue to practice; 
2. that paragraph 1 of the Recommended Order provide for 
counselling of Respondent for only one year, rather than until the 
Board recommend that it cease; and 
3. that paragraph 5 of the Recommended Order (that 
Respondent may not, after the one-year suspension of her certified 
social worker's license, engage in private practice) be reversed. 
STATUTES OR RULES PERMITTING OR REQUIRING REVIEW 
The review of this matter is being conducted by the Executive 
Director of the Department of Commerce pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
Section 63-46b-12, and Rule 151-46b-12 of the Rules of Procedure 
for Adjudicative Proceedings before the Department of Commerce. 
THE ISSUES REVIEWED 
1. Whether excluding certain evidence at the hearing 
(results of a polygraph) unfairly denied Respondent the right to 
present credible evidence on her own behalf; 
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2. Whether the Board based its findings on an issue (alleged 
adverse impact on a witness caused by Respondent's conduct) which 
was not properly before it, where evidence on that issue had been 
excluded by a prior order of the Administrative Law Judge; 
3• Whether certain facts upon which the Board relied were 
not supported by the evidence; and 
4. Whether the sanctions imposed are unduly harsh or 
otherwise unfair. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The following findings of fact in the Recommended Order 
are contested by Respondent: 
a. that there was a sexual relationship during 1985 
between Respondent and K.G., Respondent's patient for a time 
and a witness at the hearing; and 
b. that K.G. had developed a dependency upon 
Respondent. 
2. As to the existence of a sexual relationship, if any, 
between Respondent and K.G, during 1985, the Board considered 
testimony that such relationship did exist, from K.G., from K.G.'s 
brother, and from K.G.'s ex-wife. It considered testimony that 
there was no such relationship from Respondent. The Administrative 
Law Judge declined to allow evidence from a polygraph examination 
of Respondent which, Respondent argues, would have tended to 
support her testimony. Respondent asserts that the "most credible 
evidence" would have been the polygraph. Respondent does not point 
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out why the evidence from the client and others is not credible, 
nor does she offer convincing evidence or arguments that polygraph 
results are more credible than testimony from witnesses. 
3. As to whether the client had developed a dependency on 
Respondent, Respondent argues that findings of fact on this point 
are not supported by the evidence. Respondent offered no 
transcript but merely asserted this point in the request for 
review. The Order made no specific findings of fact regarding 
K.G.'s dependency upon Respondent. The Conclusions of Law stated 
in part that: 
Moreover, given K.G.'s existing problems with alcoholism 
and Respondent's diagnosis of his mental condition, it is 
critically significant she failed to understand and appreciate 
K.G. would thus tend to develop increasing dependency on her 
as his therapist. The nature of the bartering agreement 
between Respondent and K.G. also fostered such dependency and 
reflects Respondent's further failure to manage the 
therapeutic relationship in such a way that the proper 
boundaries of that relationship were clearly understood by the 
client. [Order, p. 10; italics added.] 
Given K.G.'s dependency on Respondent as his therapist, 
he perceived the contact betweem them which arose from the 
bartering agreement to be beneficial to him in a therapeutic 
sense, even though Respondent may not have either recognized 
or intended that result. However, the enhanced dependency 
created by the nature of the bartering agreement was not 
proper. [Order, p. 11; italics added.] 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. With respect to whether excluding polygraph evidence was 
unfair to Respondent, I conclude that the decision of the 
Administrative Law Judge excluding the evidence should be upheld. 
Although the rules of evidence in administrative proceedings are 
meant to be flexible and less formal than the Utah Rules of 
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Evidence, and therefore admitting polygraph evidence may have been 
permissible, the decision to deny the evidence was reasonable under 
the circumstances. The state offered precedent that polygraph 
evidence is insufficiently credible and that such evidence may be 
denied admission in the administrative forum. In addition, the 
Order was based on sufficient evidence other than that germane to 
the polygraph -- e.g. whether or not there was a sexual 
relationship at a specific time and place. Although the Board 
found sufficient evidence to support the finding that a sexual 
relationship actually occurred, even if it had not there was still 
sufficient evidence and findings to support a penalty. Aside from 
the sexual relationship, the Order found that Respondent had 
improperly socialized with the client; had not properly terminated 
the patient-therapist relationship; engaged in behavior which 
conflicted with the patient's best interests; had improperly 
conducted joint counselling with the patient and his wife; and 
otherwise failed to act in the patient's best interest. 
2. Respondent asserts that adverse impact on the patient --
primarily that he became dependent upon Respondent — was 
improperly considered by the Board. As to whether the client had 
become dependent upon Respondent, reading the quoted language from 
pages 10 and 11 of the Order, (see Findings of Fact, above, at 
paragraph 3) , it appears that the Order went from what could happen 
to assuming that it did happen. As there are no specific findings 
of fact regarding dependency, that portion of the Order concluding 
that K.G. was in fact dependent upon Respondent is overturned. 
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Even if the issue of adverse impact on the client was improperly 
before the Board it appears that the Order is supported by 
sufficient findings aside from this point. Although the issue of 
impact was addressed in the Order, it was only briefly raised. 
Rather, the Board found that Respondent exercised poor judgement 
with respect to the trip to Hawaii; she engaged in a social 
relationship and other conduct which conflicted with the best 
interests of her client; she did not adequately terminate the 
professional relationship prior to beginning a personal 
relationship; her conduct constituted unprofessional conduct within 
the meaning of Rule 153-35-5(B). From the terms of the order, it 
appears that these items were given much more weight than any 
adverse impact on K.G. and that these items were sufficient to 
support a sanction against Respondent's license. The Order clearly 
indicates that the reasons for the sanction are the actions of 
Respondent, rather than their effect on someone else. As noted 
above, the impact, if any, on the client, even if not admissible is 
a relatively minor portion of the decision. 
3. The sanctions entered are within the Board's authority. 
Both Section 58-1-15 and Section 58-35-11 allow the Board to deny, 
suspend, revoke or place on probation a license where the licensee 
has been guilty of unprofessional conduct. Based on Respondent's 
own admissions, she clearly exercised poor judgement and allowed 
the relationship to expand beyond what is appropriate professional 
conduct. While there is sufficient evidence that a sanction is 
warranted, the penalty imposed by the Board seems unduly harsh in 
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view of penalties entered in similar cases. A three year 
suspension may be unreasonable, particularly given the disputed 
facts, the passage of time with no other complaints against 
Respondent other than this one, and the fact that there does not 
appear to be a significant risk to the public health and safety. 
4. In addition, one portion of the Order needs 
clarification. Paragraph 5 of the Order is open-ended. It 
provides that upon satisfactory completion of the probation under 
the terms and conditions listed, and the expiration of the one year 
suspension of Respondent's license to practice as a ceirtified 
social worker, Respondent may practice in an agency setting but may 
not engage in private practice. The Order appears to leave this 
prohibition permanent. However, the remainder of the Order appears 
to suspend Respondent's licenses and place her on probation for a 
certain length of time, subject to certain terms and conditions. 
Although such actions are proper, the prohibition against private 
practice ought not be permanent or open-ended. Therefore, 
paragraph 5 of the Order is modified so as to make the prohibition 
against private practice less indefinite or open-ended. 
ORDER 
It is hereby ordered that: 
1. The Conclusions of Law are modified by striking the 
following portions, found on page 11 of the Findings, Conclusions 
and Order: 
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a. "Given K.G.'s dependency on Respondent as his 
therapist"; and 
b. "However, the enhanced dependency created by the 
nature of the bartering agreement was not proper." 
2. The Order (beginning on page 14 of the Findings, 
Conclusions, and Order) is modified to read as follows: 
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that Respondent's licenses to 
practice as a certified and clinical social worker in the 
State of Utah be revoked. 
It is further ordered that a stay of enforcement enter as 
to the just-stated revocations cind that Respondent's licenses 
be suspended for six (6) months and then placed on probation, 
under the terms specified hereinbelow. 
Following the terms of suspension, the revocations shall 
remain stayed and Respondent's licenses subject to probation 
for up to three (3) years, on the following terms and 
conditions: 
1. Respondent shall receive individual therapy 
from either a psychologist, psychiatrist or clinical 
social worker who has been licensed in that capacity and 
continuously so employed for at least the last five (5) 
years. At a minimum, such therapy shall address 
Respondent's ethical violations, her responsibility for 
that conduct, the manner in which her codependency may 
have contributed to her misconduct and proper procedures 
necessary to manage a client/therapist relationship. 
2. Within thirty (30) days from the date of this 
Order, Respondent shall submit the name of the above-
referenced therapist for Board review and approval. If 
the Board does not approve, then Respondent shall 
promptly submit another name until the Board approves. 
Thereafter, Respondent shall commence therapy and 
Respondent's therapist shall submit written reports to 
the Board every six (6) months as to the nature of 
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therapy provided to Respondent and her progress in that 
regard. Respondent shall execute a written consent and 
release if necessary, so as to allow her therapist to 
disclose such matters to the Board. Therapy shall 
continue until such time as Respondent's therapist 
informs the Board that therapy is no longer warranted and 
the Board recommends that therapy may cease, or until the 
expiration of the three years' probationary period, 
whichever occurs first. 
3 . Respondent shall meet with the Board during the 
next regularly scheduled Board meeting held after this 
Order becomes effective. Thereafter, Respondent shall 
meet with the Board every six (6) months during the term 
of suspension and probation. The frequency of such 
meetings may be subsequently modified, as deemed 
warranted by the Board. 
4. Respondent shall complete coursework which 
addresses the subjects of professional values and ethics, 
DSM-III, human growth and development, and clinical 
practice procedures. Within thirty (30) days from the 
date this Order becomes effective, Respondent shall 
submit an education program for Board review and 
approval, which provides a minimum of nine (9) qiiarter 
hours to be completed in that respect. 
5. During the three-year probationary period, and 
unless the Board finds that Respondent is not meeting the 
terms and conditions of probation (which finding the 
Board may make in an informal proceeding) , Respondent may 
practice as a certified social worker in an agency 
setting, but may not engage in private practice. 
Respondent's employment shall be subject to supervision 
by a licensed clinical social worker. Respondent shall 
provide prior written notice to the Board of any such 
employment and her prospective supervisor in that regard. 
Upon Board review and approval, such employment may 
commence and Respondent's supervisor shall submit written 
reports to the Board every six (6) months as to the 
nature of Respondent's duties and her performance in that 
regard. 
Should Respondent fail to comply with the above-stated 
terms and conditions, or otherwise violate any statute or rule 
which governs her practice as a social worker in the State of 
Utah, further proceedings shall be conducted and a 
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determination made whether the stay shall be rescinded and the 
revocation of Respondent's licenses shall become effective. 
2. The effective date of the Order is ten days from the date this 
order on review is issued. 
Dated this / g day of /Ifin I , 1992 
David L. Buhler, Executive Director 
Department of Commerce 
NOTICE OF RIGHT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Judicial review of this Order may be obtained by filing a 
Petition for Review within thirty (30) days after the issuance of 
this Order. Any Petition for such Review shall comply with the 
requirements set forth in Section 63-46b-14 and Section 63-46b-16. 
- 10 -
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and correct copies of 
the foregoing Petitioner's Brief to the following on this '2^: day 
of December, 1992. 
DELIA M. WELCH 
Assistant Attorney General 
36 South State Street, #1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
